Abstract
How do nuclear weapons affect states' foreign policies toward territorial disputes? Existing approaches struggle to explain the variety of behaviours exhibited by nuclear-armed states, from withdrawing claims and concluding peace treaties to initiating wars and annexation. This paper advances a novel theory—'nuclear-territorial pragmatism'—that explains these diverging outcomes. Drawing on the theory of the Nuclear Revolution, I argue that nuclear-armed states may shift the burden of national security from territorial conquest to nuclear deterrence, facilitating compromise in territorial disputes. This tendency holds, however, only where the state's nuclear deterrent is mature and domestic politics are permissive to territorial compromise; where either condition fails, nuclear-armed states will more aggressively consolidate control over disputed territory. Leveraging archival sources, case studies of Israeli and South African territorial disputes offer strong support for the theory. The findings suggest that the Nuclear Revolution remains a valuable tool for understanding the political effects of nuclear weapons.